Kalai-Smorodinsky Bargaining Solution Equilibria |
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Authors: | G De Marco J Morgan |
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Institution: | 1.Dipartimento di Statistica e Matematica per la Ricerca Economica,Università di Napoli Parthenope,Napoli,Italy;2.Dipartimento di Matematica e Statistica and CSEF,Università di Napoli Federico II,Napoli,Italy |
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Abstract: | Multicriteria games describe strategic interactions in which players, having more than one criterion to take into account,
don’t have an a-priori opinion on the relative importance of all these criteria. Roemer (Econ. Bull. 3:1–13, 2005) introduces an organizational interpretation of the concept of equilibrium: each player can be viewed as running a bargaining
game among criteria. In this paper, we analyze the bargaining problem within each player by considering the Kalai-Smorodinsky
bargaining solution (see Kalai and Smorodinsky in Econometrica 43:513–518, 1975). We provide existence results for the so called Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution equilibria for a general class of disagreement points which properly includes the one considered by Roemer (Econ. Bull. 3:1–13, 2005). Moreover we look at the refinement power of this equilibrium concept and show that it is an effective selection device even when combined with classical refinement
concepts based on stability with respect to perturbations; in particular, we consider the extension to multicriteria games
of the Selten’s trembling hand perfect equilibrium concept (see Selten in Int. J. Game Theory 4:25–55, 1975) and prove that perfect Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution equilibria exist and properly refine both the perfect equilibria
and the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution equilibria. |
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