| Abstract: | The semireactive bargaining set, a solution for cooperative games, is introduced. This solution is in general a subsolution
of the bargaining set and a supersolution of the reactive bargaining set. However, on various classes of transferable utility
games the semireactive and the reactive bargaining set coincide. The semireactive prebargaining set on TU games can be axiomatized
by one-person rationality, the reduced game property, a weak version of the converse reduced game property with respect to
subgrand coalitions, and subgrand stability. Furthermore, it is shown that there is a suitable weakening of subgrand stability,
which allows to characterize the prebargaining set. Replacing the reduced game by the imputation saving reduced game and employing
individual rationality as an additional axiom yields characterizations of both, the bargaining set and the semireactive bargaining
set.
Received September 2000/Revised version June 2001 |
