Nash refinement of equilibria |
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| Authors: | H Peters K Vrieze |
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| Institution: | (1) Department of Quantitative Economics, University of Limburg, Maastricht, The Netherlands;(2) Department of Mathematics, University of Limburg, Maastricht, The Netherlands |
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| Abstract: | A method for choosing equilibria in strategic form games is proposed and axiomatically characterized. The method as well as the axioms are inspired by the Nash bargaining theory. The method can be applied to existing refinements of Nash equilibrium (e.g., perfect equilibrium) and also to other equilibrium concepts, like correlated equilibrium.The authors thank the reviewers for their comments, which led to an improvement of the paper. |
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| Keywords: | Noncooperative games Nash equilibrium Nash bargaining solution refinements |
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