Maximizing political efficiency via electoral cycles: An optimal control model |
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| Institution: | 1. Faculty of Engineering Sciences, School of Industrial Engineering and Management, Ben-Gurion University, P.O. Box 653, Beer-Sheva 84105, Israel;2. School of Management, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, P.O. Box 653, Beer-Sheva 84105, Israel;1. Department of Electronics and Electrical Communication Engineering, Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur, Kharagpur 721302, India;2. Department of Physics and Mathematics, Aoyama Gakuin University, Kanagawa 252-5258, Japan;1. State Key Laboratory of Structural Analysis for Industrial Equipment, Dalian University of Technology, Dalian 116024, China;2. Key Laboratory of Advanced Technology for Aerospace Vehicles of Liaoning Province, Dalian University of Technology, Dalian 116024, China;3. Faculty of Electronic Information and Electrical Engineering, Dalian University of Technology, Dalian 116024, China |
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| Abstract: | The exchange between an elected politician, such as a president, prime minister or a local governor and interest groups is analyzed as an optimization problem. The optimal control model shows the conditions required from regulatory policy and resource investment in order to maximize the politician's utility from the interest group's support. Given one interest group, such a policy includes two time intervals: Well in advance of the elections the politician in office should invest a constant level of resources, while for a certain period close to the elections the politician increases or decreases investment, depending on the electoral significance of that interest group. This proves that electoral cycles not only empirically exist, but also maximize the politician's utility from interest groups' support. Given several interest groups, at each point in time, the politician should invest in the group that contribute the most for his or her political interests. |
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