|
|||||
|
|
The compromise value for NTU-games |
|
| Authors: | P Borm H Keiding R P McLean S Oortwijn S Tijs |
| Institution: | 1. Department of Economics, Tilburg University, P.O. Box 90153, 5000, LE Tilburg, The Netherlands 2. Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen, Denmark 3. Department of Economics and RUTCOR, Rutgers University, New Jersey, USA 4. Department of Mathematics, University of Nijmegen, The Netherlands |
| Abstract: | The compromise value is introduced as a single-valued solution concept for NTU-games. It is shown that the compromise value coincides with the  -value for TU-games and with the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution for bargaining problems. In addition the axiomatic characterizations of both the two-person Kalai-Smorodinsky solution and the -value can be extended to the compromise value for large classes of NTU-games.We also present an alternative NTU-extension of the TU -value (called the NTU -value) which coincides with the Nash solution for two-person bargaining problems. The definition of the NTU -value is analogous to that of the Shapley NTU-value. |
| Keywords: | |
| 本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录！ | |