碳补贴和时滞效应下低碳供应链微分博弈研究

在政府低碳补贴政策下,本文考虑技术的时滞效应,构建政府、制造商和零售商的微分博弈模型,在分散决策下分析了制造商采用远视策略和短视策略时各方的最优决策,并将结果与集中决策下的对应情形进行了比较分析。研究发现滞后效应与政府的最优补贴比率负相关。制造商的短视策略并不一定会损害收益,若滞后时间超过特定阈值,那么企业将不会投资低碳技术。集中决策下减排努力、宣传努力、减排稳定值、商誉稳定值均高于分散决策,但满足一定条件时集中决策的供应链利润会低于分散决策。

Research on Differential Game of Low Carbon Supply Chain Considering Government Subsidy and Lag Effect

Considering the time lag effect of technology, a differential game model of government, manufacturer and retailer is constructed under the government's low carbon subsidy policy. The optimal decisions of manufacturer adopting far-sighted strategy and short-sighted strategy are analyzed under decentralized decision. The results are compared with the case of centralized decision making. The lag effect is negatively correlated with the optimal subsidy ratio of the government. Manufacturers' short-sightedness does not necessarily hurt earnings. If the lag time exceeds a certain threshold, enterprises will not invest in low-carbon technologies; Under centralized decision, the effort level, emission reduction stable value and goodwill stable value of supply chain enterprises are higher than decentralized decision, but when certain conditions are met, the supply chain profit of centralized decision will be lower than decentralized decision.