考虑网络外部性的生鲜企业渠道选择策略研究

考虑到生鲜产品容易变质而且线上配送时间较长,并且线上销售可为消费者带来额外网络外部性,传统生鲜企业在电商冲击的背景下需要考虑是否入驻电商平台开拓线上业务。为解决此类企业所面临渠道选择问题,本文考虑一个传统生鲜企业和一个主导电商市场的电商平台,并通过构建理论模型研究企业最优生鲜产品定价和渠道选择策略。研究结果表明,若平台所收取年服务费较低,则企业应入驻平台;反之,企业不应入驻平台。此外,消费者网络外部性敏感程度对企业入驻平台行为具有正影响。在拓展模型,本文考虑分散式供应链情形下企业最优渠道选择,结果表明相较于集中式决策,分散式供应链情形下零售商更不愿意入驻平台。此外,本文通过设计收益共享契约以协调生鲜企业与电商平台,并发现通过契约协调,零售商更愿意入驻电商平台。

Optimal E-commerce Platform Entering Strategies of Firms Selling Fresh Agricultural Products Considering network externality

In recent years, some e-commerce platforms such as Taobao.com, JD.com and Amazon.com are rapidly developing, and consumers can obtain additional network externality from shopping online due to visual online sales, which prompts consumers to gradually shift from offline to online. In this context, if firms selling fresh agricultural products decide whether to enter e-commerce platforms, they need to consider not only increased demand from online sales but also the channel competition brought by operating online channel. Moreover, given that fresh agricultural products are perishable and online arrival time is relatively long, consumers may obtain a relatively low-quality fresh agricultural products from online shopping, which may reduce consumers’ willingness to buy and product evaluation. Therefore, firms selling fresh agricultural products need to carefully decide whether to enter e-commerce platforms as third-party sellers. To address channel selection problems faced by these firms, this paper considers a firm selling a fresh agricultural product offline and an e-commerce platform dominating the e-commerce market. According to the firm’s choice of whether entering the platform, weanalyze two cases, i.e. not entering the platform (NP) and entering the platform (EP). We develop several theoretical models to investigate optimal fresh agricultural product pricing and channel selection strategies. Some main insights are presented as follows. The results show that the firm should enter the platform if the annual service fee is relatively low; otherwise, the firm should not enter the platform. Moreover, as consumers’ sensitivity to network externality increases, the firm is more likely to enter the platform. In the extension, we consider a decentralized supply chain with a supplier and a retailer, and find that the retailer is more reluctant to enter the platform. In addition, this paper designs a revenue sharing contract to coordinate the supply chain, and finds that the retailer in the context of coordinated supply chain is more likely to enter the platform.