| 委托-代理关系下的企业筹资决策模型 |
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| 引用本文： | 李保红,杨宏志.委托-代理关系下的企业筹资决策模型[J].数学的实践与认识,2002,32(1):41-45. |
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| 作者姓名： | 李保红 杨宏志 |
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| 作者单位： | 信阳师院数学系,河南,信阳,464000 |
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| 摘 要： | 本文建立了在委托代理关系下的企业筹资决策的数学模型 .模型分析表明 ,股东在设立经理激励合同时 ,将经理报酬与权益资本利润率联系起来 ,能够激励经理选择负债经营 ,但经理选择的最优资本结构可能会偏离股东效用最大化的资本结构 .
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| 关 键 词： | 委托代理关系 资本结构 权益资本利润率 |
| 修稿时间： | 2001年11月20 |
A Model of Enterprise Finance Decision under Principal-agent Relation |
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| LI Bao-hong,YANG Hong-zhi.A Model of Enterprise Finance Decision under Principal-agent Relation[J].Mathematics in Practice and Theory,2002,32(1):41-45. |
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| Authors: | LI Bao-hong YANG Hong-zhi |
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| Abstract: | This paper presents the mathematical model of enterprise finance decision under principal-agent relation. The model analysis shows that when the shareholders make managerial incentive contract, they set the relation between the manager′s wage and equity capital profits rate, and it can inspire the manager to choose the management under debt, but the optimal capital structure the manager choose may deviate from the shareholders′ capital strucdture of the maximum utility. |
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| Keywords: | principal-agent relation capital structure equity capital profits rate |
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