When is the Boston mechanism strategy-proof? |
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| Institution: | 1. College of Science, Hunan Agricultural University, Changsha, Hunan 410128, China;2. College of Orient Science and Technology, Hunan Agricultural University, Changsha, Hunan 410128, China;1. European University at St. Petersburg. 3 Gagarinskaya st., St. Petersburg, 191187, Russia;2. St. Petersburg Institute for Economics and Mathematics RAS. 1 Chaikovskogo st., St. Petersburg, 191187, Russia;3. St. Petersburg State University. 62 Chaikovskogo st., St. Petersburg, 191123, Russia;1. International School of Economics at Tbilisi State University, Georgia;2. Electronics and Computer Science, University of Southampton, UK;3. Schools of Mathematics & Management, University of Southampton, UK;1. Department of Economics, Yokohama National University, 79-3 Tokiwadai, Hodogaya-ku, Yokohama 240-8501, Japan;2. Faculty of Economics, Fukuoka University, 8-19-1 Nanakuma, Jonan-ku, Fukuoka 814-0180, Japan;1. Department of Economics and Finance, Montclair State University, Montclair, NJ 07043, United States;2. Department of Economics, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853, United States |
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| Abstract: | Kumano (2013) is the first to investigate the Boston school choice mechanism (BOSM) under restricted priority domains. This paper strengthens and extends his result and shows that the BOSM is strategy-proof, if and only if it is fair, if and only if it is equivalent to the student-optimal stable mechanism (SOSM), and if and only if the number of total seats at any two schools exceeds the number of students. |
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