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Infinite Hierarchical Potential Games
Authors:L Mallozi  S Tijs  M Voorneveld
Institution:(1) Dipartimento di Matematica e Applicazioni, Università di Napoli Federico II, Napoli, Italia;(2) Department of Econometrics and CentER, Tilburg University, Tilburg, Netherlands;(3) Department of Econometrics and CentER, Tilburg University, Tilburg, Netherlands
Abstract:Hierarchical potential games with infinite strategy sets are considered. For these games, pessimistic Stackelberg equilibria are characterized as minimum points of the potential function; properties are studied and illustrated with examples.
Keywords:potential games  hierarchical decision making  multilevel optimization problems
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