The stable admissions polytope |
| |
| Authors: | Mourad Baïou Michel Balinski |
| |
| Affiliation: | (1) Laboratoire d’économétrie, école Polytechnique, Paris, and Departamento de Ingenieria Matematica, Universidad de Chile, Santiago, Chile, CL;(2) CNRS and Laboratoire d’économétrie, école Polytechnique, Paris, France, FR |
| |
| Abstract: | ![]()
The stable admissions polytope– the convex hull of the stable assignments of the university admissions problem – is described by a set of linear inequalities. It depends on a new characterization of stability and arguments that exploit and extend a graphical approach that has been fruitful in the analysis of the stable marriage problem. Received: April 10, 1998 / Accepted: June 3, 1999?Published online January 27, 2000 |
| |
| Keywords: | : stable assignment – stable marriage – two-sided market – polytopes – graphs – many-to-one matching |
| 本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录！ |
|
