Bidders and dispenser: manipulative hypergames in a multinational context

The object of this paper is to present an introduction to the basic ideas of Hypergame Analysis, and to illustrate these by building some models of a particular type of situation.Hypergame Analysis is an extension of the Game-theoretic framework, the purpose of which is to enable one to model situations in which the various parties are not well-informed of each other's preferences and strategies. we take as a basic structure not a single game, but a linked set of ‘perceived’ games: this, in essence, is what constitutes a Hypergame. Misperceptions may arise accidentally or be deliberately induced. Thus, a player may be acting ‘rationally’ relative to the game he perceives, but this game itself may have been ‘set up’ to suit the interests of some other party.The technique is used to explore situations in which several parties (the ‘bidders’) negotiate competitively with another (the ‘dispenser’) who is able to accept whichever bidder's offer is most advantageous to him. In particular, the ability of the dispenser to ‘play off’ one bidder against another is examined. This is related to an account of the siting of new plant by a Multi-National Corporation. Some general implications are suggested: especially, it is argued that to have a reasonable chance of producing adequate forecasts in such difficult situations, modelling techniques must embody at least this degree of conceptual complexity.