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战略性新兴产业创新金融支持机理及两阶段演化博弈分析
引用本文:刘国巍,邵云飞.战略性新兴产业创新金融支持机理及两阶段演化博弈分析[J].运筹与管理,2021,30(4):87-95.
作者姓名:刘国巍  邵云飞
作者单位:1.电子科技大学 经济与管理学院,四川 成都 611731; 2.桂林航天工业学院 产学研协同创新与创业研究中心,广西 桂林 541004
基金项目:国家自然科学基金资助项目(71764004,71872027);“广西高等学校千名中青年骨干教师培育计划”人文社会科学类立项课题(2020QGRW031);广西中青年教师基础能力提升项目(2020KY21027)。
摘    要:为了研究金融支持如何影响战略性新兴产业创新主体培育的问题,在剖析金融支持主体间双螺旋耦合机理基础上,构建了战略性新兴产业金融支持两阶段演化博弈模型,运用动态系统的相平面理论求取两阶段ESS近似解析解,并借助MATLAB实现两阶段演化博弈模型的数值仿真,分析不同参数赋值对两阶段ESS演进的影响。研究发现:(1)存在机会主义(补贴创新利润率T1<创新外活动利润率T2)和非机会主义行为(k>T2)两种对立占优情境;(2)机会主义行为(或非机会主义)占优情境下,金融支持主体的期望社会效用越小(或越大)、适度减小(或增加)补贴金额,越有利于提升战略性新兴产业创新主体接受补贴的积极性;(3)战略性新兴产业创新主体的自有资金R对其积极性影响不大,而补贴资金利率a越稳定越有利于提高其积极性。基于上述结论,本文最后构建了战略性新兴产业金融支持两阶段ESS演进实现框架,并探究其“累积式”、“悖论式”、“累积—悖论式”递进功能路径,为政府制定提升创新主体培育金融支持效率的相关政策提供了理论支持。

关 键 词:战略性新兴产业  金融支持  产业创新  两阶段演化博弈  
收稿时间:2018-05-21

Study on the Financial Support Mechanism and T-S Evolutionary Game of the Strategic Emerging Industries
LIU Guo-wei,SHAO Yun-fei.Study on the Financial Support Mechanism and T-S Evolutionary Game of the Strategic Emerging Industries[J].Operations Research and Management Science,2021,30(4):87-95.
Authors:LIU Guo-wei  SHAO Yun-fei
Institution:1. School of Management and Economics, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 611731, China; 2. Collaborative Innovation and Entrepreneurship Research Center of Industry-university-research, Guilin University of Aerospace Technology, Guilin 541004, China
Abstract:This paper aims to solve the problem of how the financial support affects the cultivation of the innovative body in the strategic emerging industries.On the basis of analyzing the mechanism of double helix coupling among financial support agents,a two-stage evolutionary game model of the financial support in the strategic emerging industries is built.Then,the phase plane theory of the dynamic system is used to calculate the approximate analytical solution of the two-stage ESS.Finally,with the aid of MATLAB,the numerical simulation of the two-stage evolutionary game model is realized in order to analyze the influence of different parameters on the evolution of the two-stage ESS.The results show that:(1)there are opportunistic behavior and non-opportunistic behavior,which are opposite and one of them is dominant;(2)when the opportunistic behavior(or non-opportunistic behavior)is dominant,the u value of the financial support body will be smaller(or larger),and decrease(or increase)moderately,the subsidy k will be conducive to enhancing the positivity of innovative body in the strategic emerging industry to accept the subsidy;(3)the self-owned funds R of the innovative body in the strategic emerging industry has little influence on the positivity,but the more stable the subsidy funds rate is,the more beneficial it is to improve their enthusiasm.Based on these conclusions,this paper constructs a two-stage ESS evolutionary framework of the strategic emerging industries financial support,and explores its path of progressive function from“cumulative function”to“paradoxical function”and to“cumulative-paradoxical function”,so as to finish the balanced evolution of the two-stage ESS from“supporting actively”to“accepting actively”,which provides theoretical support for the government to formulate relevant policies that improve the efficiency of financial support for the cultivation of innovative subjects.
Keywords:strategic emerging industries  financial support  industrial innovation  two-stage evolutionary game
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