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市场与规制双重不确定下企业环境投资行为选择
引用本文:葛世龙,刘小峰.市场与规制双重不确定下企业环境投资行为选择[J].运筹与管理,2021,30(4):148-154.
作者姓名:葛世龙  刘小峰
作者单位:1.南京审计大学 信息工程学院,江苏 南京 211815; 2.上海交通大学 安泰经济与管理学院,上海 200030; 3.南京财经大学 会计学院,江苏 南京 210023
基金项目:国家自然科学基金资助项目(71671080);江苏高校优势学科建设工程资助项目(PAPD);江苏省青蓝工程资助项目;江苏省公共工程审计重点实验室课题研究基金(GGSS2016-02)。
摘    要:通过主体适应性规则构建企业环境投资行为模型,从政府环境规制和市场波动等方面刻画企业环境投资决策面临的不确定性,基于计算实验方法探寻企业在基准、震荡、上涨与下跌等4种情景下的环境投资行为规律。研究发现:政府规制强度越强,企业环境投资越充分,但投资偏差现象越明显。在震荡情景中,企业的环境投资行为表现出非理性状态,在上涨情景中,企业环境投资表现出过度反应。当市场产品价格波动处在单边行情,政府可以通过较为宽松的环境规制实现目标,而当市场产品价格处在震荡波动时,政府需要通过较为严格的环境规制刺激企业进行环境投资。企业的环境投资受到政府规制与市场信号的共同影响,政府的环境规制稳定的持续刺激并不会让企业盲目投资,但政府环境规制的频繁变动却会使企业无所适从。

关 键 词:环境规制  市场波动  环境投资  计算实验  投资效率  
收稿时间:2019-05-07

Study on Behavior Choice of Corporate Environmental Investment under Double Uncertainty of Market and Regulation
GE Shi-long,LIU Xiao-feng.Study on Behavior Choice of Corporate Environmental Investment under Double Uncertainty of Market and Regulation[J].Operations Research and Management Science,2021,30(4):148-154.
Authors:GE Shi-long  LIU Xiao-feng
Institution:1. School of Information Engineering, Nanjing Audit University, Nanjing 211815, China; 2. Antai College of Economics & Management, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai 200030, China; 3. School of Accounting, Nanjing University of Finance and Economics, Nanjing 210023, China
Abstract:A model is built to analyze corporate environmental investment behavior based on the agent’s self-adaptive rules.In government environmental regulation and market volatility,the uncertainty of corporate environmental investment decision is depicted.The laws of corporate environmental investment behaviors are explored by the method of computational experiment under four scenarios including benchmark,fluctuation,rise and fall.Experiments results show that environmental regulation uncertainty is positively related to a firm’s environmental investment.The stronger the intensity of government regulation,the more fully firm’s environmental investment.However,we find the investment’bias is more obvious.In the oscillating situation,the behavior of corporate environmental investment is not rational.In the rising situation,the corporate environmental investment is an overreaction.When commodity price fluctuates at one side,the government can use flexible environmental regulation to achieve goals.However,when the commodity price shocks,government will need to use more strict environmental regulation to stimulate enterprises to invest in environment.Finally,both the government environmental regulation and market signal affect the environmental investment behavior.The continuous stimulation of the government environmental regulation will not cause enterprises to make blinded investment,but the frequent change of environmental regulations will make enterprises have no idea about taking their action.
Keywords:environmental regulation  market fluctuations  environmental investment  computational experiments  investment efficiency
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