非同质演化博弈及其在移动污染源监管中的应用

移动污染源是中国环境治理的难点之一。本文分析了监管者与机动车移动污染源之间的博弈关系。通过考察边际成本与边际收益的方式建立了非同质演化博弈模型,讨论了监管成本变化以及机动车异质性治污成本对均衡点位置的影响。计算结果表明,受不同成本特性影响,机动车移动污染源监管博弈会呈现三种不同均衡状态:有效监管状态、无效监管状态和形式监管。在有效监管状态下,较低的处罚水平导致治污水平低下;监管力量薄弱地区会出现无效监管状态;在形式监管中,不规范的责令整改方式会导致整改水平低下的形式主义问题。主要结论为:应提高机动车超标排污处罚水平以提升机动车治污概率;应建立机动车移动污染长效协作监管机制,采用新技术手段,以降低监管成本,加强监管效果;需规范责令整改的程序与流程,防范形式主义。

A Non-homogeneous Evolutionary Game Research on Mobile Source Pollution Regulation

Mobile source pollution is a difficulty in China's environmental regulation. The relationship between regulators and vehicle polluters is analyzed here. A non-homogeneous evolutionary game model is established by studying marginal costs and marginal benefits, and the influence of changing regulatory costs and non-homogeneous pollution control costs on the evolutionary stability strategy(ESS)is analyzed. The calculation results show that, under different cost conditions, there are three evolutionary equilibriums: effective supervision, ineffective supervision and formal supervision. Among them, the lower penalty level leads to the problem of low pollution control level in the effective supervision; Ineffective supervision will appear in areas with weak supervision strength; In the formal supervision, non-standard rectification will lead to formalism problem of low improvement. The main conclusions are as follows: The penalty level of motor vehicles pollution should be increased to reduce pollution emission; The long-term cooperation mechanism of motor pollution supervision and new technologies should be adopted to reduce supervision costs and strengthen the supervision effect; The rectification procedures should be standardized to prevent formalism in mobile source pollution regulation.