A 2-stage strategy updating rule promotes cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game |
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Authors: | Fang Xiang-Sheng Zhu Ping Liu Run-Ran Liu En-Yu Wei Gui-Yi |
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Institution: | a Department of Information Science, Anhui Institute of Economic Management, Hefei 230059, China;b Networking and Distributed Computing Laboratory, Zhejiang Gongshang University, Hangzhou 310018, China;c Institute for Information Economy, Hangzhou Normal University, Hangzhou 310036, China;d South China University of Technology, Guangzhou 510641, China |
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Abstract: | In this study, we propose a spatial prisoner's dilemma game model with a 2-stage strategy updating rule, and focus on the cooperation behavior of the system. In the first stage, i.e., the pre-learning stage, a focal player decides whether to update his strategy according to the pre-learning factor β and the payoff difference between himself and the average of his neighbors. If the player makes up his mind to update, he enters into the second stage, i.e., the learning stage, and adopts a strategy of a randomly selected neighbor according to the standard Fermi updating rule. The simulation results show that the cooperation level has a non-trivial dependence on the pre-learning factor. Generally, the cooperation frequency decreases as the pre-learning factor increases; but a high cooperation level can be obtained in the intermediate region of -3<β<-1. We then give some explanations via studying the co-action of pre-learning and learning. Our results may sharpen the understanding of the influence of the strategy updating rule on evolutionary games. |
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Keywords: | evolutionary game theory strategy updating social cooperation prisoner's dilemma game |
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