基于动态演化博弈分析的投贷联动创新机制研究

通过一个包含股权投资公司、商业银行以及政府三方主体的动态演化博弈模型,建立了一种由政府引导的投贷联动创新机制。理想状态下,科创企业能够获得商业银行的信贷支持,非科创企业能够通过股权融资降低财务杠杆,政府则通过对投贷联动进行协调获得更高的税收与股权投资收益。研究发现,政府在进一步推动投贷联动中发挥着不可替代的重要作用,提高项目质量、提高对非科创企业的价值提升能力以及适当的政府干预是推动投贷联动顺利开展的三条重要路径。研究结论对进一步推动供给侧结构性改革,缓解科创企业融资困境,降低企业杠杆率具有一定的参考价值。

Research on the Innovation Mechanism of Investment-Loan Linkage Based on Dynamic Evolutionary Game Analysis

Through a dynamic evolutionary game model involving equity investment companies, commercial banks and the government, a government-guided Investment-Loan Linkage is established. Ideally, technological enterprises could obtain credit support from commercial banks, non-technol ogicalones could reduce financial leverage through equity financing, and the government could obtain higher taxes and equity income. It is found that the government plays an irreplaceable important role in further promoting the linkage between investment and loan. Improvement of the project quality, value promotion of non-technological enterprises and appropriate government intervention are three important paths to promoting investment-loan linkage. The research conclusion has certain reference value for further promoting the supply-side structural reform, easing the financing dilemma of technological enterprises, and reducing the corporate leverage ratio.