Noncooperative formation of coalitions in hedonic games |
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Authors: | Francis Bloch Effrosyni Diamantoudi |
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Institution: | 1.Ecole Polytechnique,Palaiseau,France;2.Concordia University,Montreal,Canada |
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Abstract: | We study a bargaining procedure of coalition formation in the class of hedonic games, where players’ preferences depend solely
on the coalition they belong to. We provide an example of nonexistence of a pure strategy stationary perfect equilibrium,
and a necessary and sufficient condition for existence. We show that when the game is totally stable (the game and all its
restrictions have a nonempty core), there always exists a no-delay equilibrium generating core outcomes. Other equilibria
exhibiting delay or resulting in unstable outcomes can also exist. If the core of the hedonic game and its restrictions always
consist of a single point, we show that the bargaining game admits a unique stationary perfect equilibrium, resulting in the
immediate formation of the core coalition structure. |
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Keywords: | |
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