Economic demography in fuzzy spatial dilemmas and power laws |
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Authors: | Email author" target="_blank">H?FortEmail author N?Pérez |
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Institution: | (1) Instituto de Física, Facultad de Ciencias, Universidad de la República, Iguá 4225, 11400 Montevideo, Uruguay;(2) Instituto de Física, Facultad de Ciencias, Universidad de la República, Iguá 4225, 11400 Montevideo, Uruguay |
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Abstract: | Adaptive agents, playing the iterated Prisoner s Dilemma (IPD) in a
two-dimensional spatial setting and governed by Pavlovian strategies
( higher success-higher chance to stay ), are used to approach the problem
of cooperation between self-interested individuals from a novel angle: We
investigate the effect of different possible measures of success (MS) used
by players to asses their performance in the game. These MS involve
quantities such as: the player s utilities U, his cumulative score (or
capital ) W, his neighborhood welfare , etc. To handle an imprecise
concept like success the agents use fuzzy logic. The degree of
cooperation, the economic demography and the efficiency attained by
the system depend dramatically on the MS. Specifically, patterns of
segregation or exploitation are observed for some MS. On the other
hand, power laws, that may be interpreted as signatures of critical
self-organization (SOC), constitute a common feature for all the MS. |
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Keywords: | |
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