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Entropic Penalties in Finite Games
Authors:S.?D.?Fl?m  mailto:sjur.flaam@econ.uib.no"   title="  sjur.flaam@econ.uib.no"   itemprop="  email"   data-track="  click"   data-track-action="  Email author"   data-track-label="  "  >Email author,E.?Cavazzuti
Affiliation:(1) Department of Economics, University of Bergen, Norway;(2) Department of Mathematics, University of Modena, 4100, Italy
Abstract:
The main objects here are finite-strategy games in which entropic terms are subtracted from the payoffs. After such subtraction each Nash equilibrium solves an explicit, unconstrained, nonlinear system of smooth equations. That system, while characteristic of perturbed best responses, is amenable in computation. It also facilitates analysis of fictitious play, learning by reinforcement, and evolutionary dynamics.
Keywords:finite games  Nash equilibrium  fictitious play  stimulus-response  gradient methods  evolutionary dynamics  entropy
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