Entropic Penalties in Finite Games |
| |
Authors: | S.?D.?Fl?m mailto:sjur.flaam@econ.uib.no" title=" sjur.flaam@econ.uib.no" itemprop=" email" data-track=" click" data-track-action=" Email author" data-track-label=" " >Email author,E.?Cavazzuti |
| |
Affiliation: | (1) Department of Economics, University of Bergen, Norway;(2) Department of Mathematics, University of Modena, 4100, Italy |
| |
Abstract: | ![]() The main objects here are finite-strategy games in which entropic terms are subtracted from the payoffs. After such subtraction each Nash equilibrium solves an explicit, unconstrained, nonlinear system of smooth equations. That system, while characteristic of perturbed best responses, is amenable in computation. It also facilitates analysis of fictitious play, learning by reinforcement, and evolutionary dynamics. |
| |
Keywords: | finite games Nash equilibrium fictitious play stimulus-response gradient methods evolutionary dynamics entropy |
本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录! |
|