Bounded rationality, strategy simplification, and equilibrium |
| |
Authors: | Hubie Chen |
| |
Institution: | 1. Departament de Tecnologies de la Informació i les Comunicacions, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, Spain
|
| |
Abstract: | It is frequently suggested that predictions made by game theory could be improved by considering computational restrictions when modeling agents. Under the supposition that players in a game may desire to balance maximization of payoff with minimization of strategy complexity, Rubinstein and co-authors studied forms of Nash equilibrium where strategies are maximally simplified in that no strategy can be further simplified without sacrificing payoff. Inspired by this line of work, we introduce a notion of equilibrium whereby strategies are also maximally simplified, but with respect to a simplification procedure that is more careful in that a player will not simplify if the simplification incents other players to deviate. We study such equilibria in two-player machine games in which players choose finite automata that succinctly represent strategies for repeated games; in this context, we present techniques for establishing that an outcome is at equilibrium and present results on the structure of equilibria. |
| |
Keywords: | |
本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录! |
|