Periodic stopping games |
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Authors: | Ayala Mashiah-Yaakovi |
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Institution: | (1) School of Mathematical Sciences, Tel Aviv University, 69978 Tel Aviv, Israel |
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Abstract: | Stopping games (without simultaneous stopping) are sequential games in which at every stage one of the players is chosen,
who decides whether to continue the interaction or stop it, whereby a terminal payoff vector is obtained. Periodic stopping
games are stopping games in which both of the processes that define it, the payoff process as well as the process by which
players are chosen, are periodic and do not depend on the past choices. We prove that every periodic stopping game without
simultaneous stopping, has either periodic subgame
perfect ϵ-equilibrium or a subgame perfect 0-equilibrium in pure strategies.
This work is part of the master thesis of the author done under the supervision of Prof. Eilon Solan. I am thankful to Prof.
Solan for his inspiring guidance. I also thank two anonymous referees of the International Journal of Game Theory for their
comments. |
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Keywords: | Stopping games Dynkin games Stochastic games Subgame-perfect equilibrium |
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