| 税企博弈模型的再研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 刘京娟. 税企博弈模型的再研究[J]. 数学的实践与认识, 1998, 0(4) |
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| 作者姓名： | 刘京娟 |
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| 作者单位： | 湖南税务高等专科学校 长沙410116 |
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| 摘 要： | 本文以文[1]基础,在更一般条件下提出了税企博弈模型,得到新的骗税罚款系数公式.从理论上证明了税务机关对企业抽样检查与全面检查具有相同的经济效果.最后,给出建模应注意的几个问题.
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| 关 键 词： | 博弈模型 混合策略 罚款系数 查出比例 |
A Further Study on the Model of Taxation Bureau and Entrepreneur Game |
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| LlU JlNG-JUAN. A Further Study on the Model of Taxation Bureau and Entrepreneur Game[J]. Mathematics in Practice and Theory, 1998, 0(4) |
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| Authors: | LlU JlNG-JUAN |
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| Abstract: | On the basis of paper [1], this paper puts forward a game model between tax-ation bureau and entrepreneur under the more general condition. We get a new penalty coefficient formnlar for the entreprenenr's fraudnlent activity, and prove that taxation bu-reau's sampling inspection has the same economic effect as the ail inspection. In the end, we give out some points which we must pay attention to in modelling. |
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| Keywords: | Game model mixed strategy penalty coefficient ratio of checking out |
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