A class of differential games for which the closed-loop and open-loop Nash equilibria coincide |
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Authors: | J F Reinganum |
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Institution: | (1) California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, California |
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Abstract: | It is well known that, in general, Nash equilibria in open-loop strategies do not coincide with those in closed-loop strategies. This note identifies a class of differential games in which the Nash equilibrium in closed-loop strategies is degenerate, in the sense that it depends on time only. Consequently, the closed-loop equilibrium is also an equilibrium in open-loop strategies.The helpful comments of Professors Y. C. Ho, G. Leitmann, H. Y. Wan, Jr., and an anonymous referee are gratefully acknowledged. |
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Keywords: | Differential games Nash equilibria open-loop strategies closed-loop strategies |
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