双重委托-代理理论在税收流失中的应用

本文研究了我国国税局和地税局在税收征管上的合作问题。首次应用双重委托一代理理论对该问题进行了经济分析。研究发现，国税局和地税局在税收征收和税收监管上完全合作时，相对而言，能最大化它们的总效用；而当国税局和地税局只在税收监管上合作时，税收征收上的“正外部性”将导致相对“过剩”的监管；最后，如果国税局和地税局完全不合作时，监管上的“搭便车”效应是影响博弈结果的主导因素。研究结果有一定的现实意义。

Double-Principal Agent Theorem in Application to the Tax Evasion

This paper investigates the cooperative problem between the National Taxation Administration and the Local Taxation Bureau of China. This article firstly uses the double-principal agent theorem to analyse this problem. The main findings are as follows; Relatively, the National Taxation Administration and the Local Taxation Bureau maximize their total effects when they fully cooperate in the tax collection and administration; when only cooperating in tax monitoring, a positive externality in the tax collection will result in excessive monitoring; lastly, when they don't cooperate at all, the effects of "free riding" in tax monitoring become the leading factor affecting the game results. These results are of practical significance.