Feedback Stackelberg equilibrium strategies when the private label competes with the national brand

We consider a noncooperative differential game where a retailer sells her own private label in addition to the manufacturer’s brand. We assume that each brand’s goodwill evolves according to a modified Nerlove-Arrow dynamics, in such a way that the advertising effort of one brand hurts the competitor’s goodwill stock. We characterize Feedback-Stackelberg pricing and advertising strategies and employ simulations to analyze their sensitivity to the main model parameters. We thank an anonymous Reviewer for very helpful comments. Research supported by NSERC, Canada, and FQRSC, Quebec. Research completed when the second author was a visiting professor at GERAD, HEC Montréal. The second author’s research was partially supported by MEC and JCYL under projects SEJ2005-03858/ECON and VA045A06, co-financed by FEDER funds.