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基于微分博弈的区域经济合作行为分析
引用本文:曾冰.基于微分博弈的区域经济合作行为分析[J].经济数学,2019,36(1):25-31.
作者姓名:曾冰
作者单位:江西财经大学 江西经济发展与改革研究院,江西 南昌,330013
摘    要:针对区域经济合作行为问题,构建微分博弈模型,将区域合作情况分为弱弱型拮抗博弈、强弱型主从博弈、强强型协同博弈三类,并考察其最优努力策略、最优收益与联盟总体收益变化.研究结果显示:①地区间经济合作努力程度随着合作成本系数、产出漏损系数的上升而下降,随着边际努力产出系数、边际努力收益系数、产出影响系数的上升而上升;②"激励因子"作为一种激励机制,可提高地区间合作努力度、最优收益及联盟整体收益;③三种类型中,强强性协同博弈最优策略及整体最优收益均严格优于其他两种情形.但这种协同合作需要确定联盟整体收益分配系数的取值范围.

关 键 词:微分博弈  合作  弱弱型  强弱型  强强型

Analysis of Regional Economic Cooperation Behavior Based on Differential Game Theory
ZENG Bing.Analysis of Regional Economic Cooperation Behavior Based on Differential Game Theory[J].Mathematics in Economics,2019,36(1):25-31.
Authors:ZENG Bing
Institution:(Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics, Nachcang,Jiangxi 331100,China)
Abstract:Aiming at the problems of regional economic cooperation, we construct the differential game model of regional cooperation which is divided into weak-weak game, strong-weak game and strong-strong game, to investigate the optimal effort strategy, optimal revenue and alliance overall income changes. The research results show that: 1)the degree of the regional economic cooperation efforts decrease with the increasing of cooperation cost coefficient, output leakage coefficient, and with the increase of marginal effort output coefficient, marginal effort income coefficient, and output impact coefficient, the marginal effort coefficient increases; 2)the incentive factors as an incentive mechanism, can improve the regional cooperation degree of enthusiasm, the optimal revenue and total revenue of the league; 3) among the three types in the game, the S-S game optimal strategies and the overall optimal revenue strong collaborative are strictly better than the other two kinds of situations. But this cooperation needs to determine the value range of the overall income distribution coefficient of the alliance.
Keywords:differential game  cooperation  weak-weak type  strong-weak type  strong-strong type
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