展厅模式下制造商的质量与价格竞争

根据消费者对线上产品信息的了解程度,将市场中消费者分为高信息消费者和低信息消费者,利用Hotelling模型构造消费者的效用函数,分析两个竞争性的制造商关于开设展厅的Bertrand博弈以及制造商开设展厅后的质量和价格决策,并进行均衡分析。结果表明:当开设展厅的固定成本很低或可以忽略不计时,若低信息消费者对线上产品信任度很低,两个制造商都会开设展厅,同时其最优价格以及质量都会增加,但双方都获得较低的利润,陷入囚徒的困境;若低信息消费者对线上产品信任度很高时,两个制造商都不开设展厅,双方达到帕累托最优;当低信息消费者对线上产品信任度中等时,均衡策略与市场中低信息消费者比例有关,低信息消费者较多时,都不开设展厅,低信息消费者较少时,都开设展厅。当开设展厅的固定成本达到某一值,无论市场中的低信息消费者的多少或者信任度的高低,制造商都不会开设展厅。

A Quality-price Competition between Manufacturers Based on Showroom

This paper divides consumers into high-level and low-level informed ones based on different consumers with different product information, and then establishes the utility function for each consumer. Subsequently, it analyzes the Bertrand game between two manufacturers about whether to open the showroom and their corresponding quality-price strategies after opening showrooms. The results show that when the fixed cost of showroom is low or can be ignored, both manufactures would open showrooms if low-level informed consumers have a low trust degree of online products, and meanwhile their optimal prices and quality will increase, but both manufacturers would get the least profits and are trapped into Prisoner’s Dilemma. While under the condition of low-level informed consumers with high trust degree of online products, both manufacturers will choose not to open showrooms, and both parties achieve Pareto optimality. And when their trust degree is medium or partial, both manufactures would open showrooms or choose not to open showrooms, which are connected with the proportion of low-level informed consumers. However, while the fixed cost of opening showroom reaches a certain value, no matter how many low-level informed consumers or how high the trust degree of the low-level informed consumers in the market it has, the manufacturer will not open showroom.