首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     


A Qualitative Characterization of Symmetric Open-Loop Nash Equilibria in Discounted Infinite Horizon Differential Games
Authors:C. Ling  M. R. Caputo
Affiliation:1.School of Economics,Southwestern University of Finance and Economics,Chengdu,China;2.Department of Economics,University of Central Florida,Orlando,USA
Abstract:
The local stability, steady state comparative statics, and local comparative dynamics of symmetric open-loop Nash equilibria for the ubiquitous class of discounted infinite horizon differential games are investigated. It is shown that the functional forms and values of the parameters specified in a differential game are crucial in determining the local stability of a steady state and, in turn, the steady state comparative statics and local comparative dynamics. A simple sufficient condition for a steady state to be a local saddle point is provided. The power and reach of the results are demonstrated by applying them to two well-known differential games.
Keywords:
本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录!
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号