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Identity, Leibniz's Law and Non-transitive Reasoning |
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| Authors: | Pablo Cobreros Paul Egré David Ripley Robert van Rooij |
| Institution: | 1. Department of Philosophy, University of Navarra, 31009, Pamplona, Spain 2. Département d’Etudes Cognitives de l’ENS, Institut Jean-Nicod (CNRS-EHESS-ENS), 29, rue d’Ulm, 75005, Paris, France 3. Department of Philosophy, University of Connecticut, 101 Manchester Hall, 344 Mansfield Rd, Storrs, CT, 06269, USA 4. School of Historical and Philosophical Studies—Old Quad, University of Melbourne, Parkville, Melbourne, VIC, 3010, Australia 5. Institute for Logic, Language and Computation, Universiteit van Amsterdam, P.O. Box 94242, 1090 GE, Amsterdam, The Netherlands |
| Abstract: | Arguments based on Leibniz's Law seem to show that there is no room for either indefinite or contingent identity. The arguments seem to prove too much, but their conclusion is hard to resist if we want to keep Leibniz's Law. We present a novel approach to this issue, based on an appropriate modification of the notion of logical consequence. |
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