On the incentive properties of multi-item auctions |
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Authors: | Mitsunobu Miyake |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Economics, University of Kagawa, 760 Takamatsu, Japan |
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Abstract: | In a market of indivisible objects where a buyer consumes at most one object, the buyer-optimal auction is a multi-item generalization of Vickrey's second-price auction. If the optimal auction is formulated as a strategic game, it is well-known that it satisfies good incentive properties, i.e., the honest strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium, a unique perfect equilibrium and a dominant strategy equilibrium. For each of the three incentive properties, it is shown that the optimal auction is aunique auction satisfying the property. The uniqueness results are derived in a general setting with budget constraints and non-linear utilities.I would like to thank three anonymous referees for detailed comments and constructive suggestions. I would also like to thank Edward J. Green and John G. Riley for their valuable comments and advice on earlier drafts of this paper. I am solely responsible for any errors. |
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Keywords: | Multi-item auctions Nash equilibrium perfect equilibrium dominant strategy equilibrium |
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