An axiomatic characterization of the potential decisiveness index |
| |
Authors: | Josep Freixas Montserrat Pons |
| |
Institution: | 1.Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya,Barcelona,Spain |
| |
Abstract: | Let us consider that somebody is extremely interested in increasing the probability of a proposal to be approved by a certain committee and that to achieve this goal he/she is prepared to pay off one member of the committee. In a situation like this one, and assuming that vote-buying is allowed and free of stigma, which voter should be offered a bribe? The potential decisiveness index for simple games, which measures the effect that ensuring one positive vote produces for the probability of passing the issue at hand, is a good tool with which to acquire the answer. An axiomatic characterization of this index is given in this paper, and its relation to other classical power indices is shown. |
| |
Keywords: | |
本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录! |
|