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Strong equilibria in claim games corresponding to convex games |
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| Authors: | Ana Meca-Martínez J. Sánchez-Soriano I. García-Jurando Stef Tijs |
| Affiliation: | (1) Department of Statistics and OR, Faculty of Sciences, University of Alicante, San Vicente del Raspeig, 03071 Alicante, Spain, ES;(2) Department of Statistics and OR, University of Santiago de Compostela, 15706, Santiago de Compostela, Spain, ES;(3) Department of Econometrics, Tilburg University, P.O. Box 90153, LE Tilburg, The Netherlands, NL |
| Abstract: | This paper deals with a specific aspect of the problem of coalition formation in a situation described by a TU-game. First, we define a very simple normal form game which models the process of coalition formation. To define the payoff functions of the players we use an allocation rule for TU-games. The main objective of this paper is ascertain what conditions of the allocation rule lead to the grand coalition being a strong equilibrium of the normal form game, when the original TU-game is convex. Received January 1996/Revised version December 1996/Final version May 1997 |
| Keywords: | : Coalition formation normal form game convex TV-game strong equilibrium |
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