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Designing contracts for a closed-loop supply chain under information asymmetry |
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| Authors: | Pan Zhang Yu Xiong Zhongkai Xiong Wei Yan |
| Institution: | 1. School of Economics and Business Administration, Chongqing University, Chongqing, 400030, China;2. Chongqing Key Laboratory of Logistics, Chongqing University, Chongqing, 400030, China;3. Norwich Business School, University of East Anglia, Norwich, NR4 7TJ, UK |
| Abstract: | This paper studies the problem of designing contracts in a closed-loop supply chain when the cost of collection effort is the retailer’s private information. We investigate four cases: two contracts (a two-part nonlinear contract and a collection effort requirement contract), each under complete information and asymmetric information. We derive the manufacturer’s optimal contracts for all four cases and analyze the impact of information on the equilibrium results of supply chain members. |
| Keywords: | Supply chain management Reverse logistics Remanufacturing Asymmetric information Contracting |
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