需求信息不对称下多渠道供应链的协调定价

针对由一个制造商和一个零售商组成的两层供应链,其中制造商拥有网络直销渠道和传统零售渠道组成的多渠道问题,运用stackelberg博弈分别进行了制造商和零售商需求信息不对称时二者集中控制和分散控制时的最优定价分析,结果表明分散控制会降低供应链的总体效率,继而为了提高多渠道供应链的效率,通过数量折扣模型对多渠道供应链进行协调定价,最后进行了算例验证及有效性分析,结果表明数量折扣模型能使多渠道供应链中的制造商和传统零售商达到双赢,它是合理有效的。

Coordination Pricing in Multi-channels Supply Chain with Asymmetric Demand Information

In recent years, with e-commerce widely used, direct channel has been developed fastly. Many enterprises begin to increase direct channel on the basis of traditional retailing channel. To the problem of one-manufacturer one-retailer supply chain with asymmetric demand information between the two members,the manufacturer owns multi-channels composed by direct channel and traditional retailing channel. This paper analyzes the optimal wholesale price of the manufacturer and retailer when they centralize control and decentralized control with stackelberg Game Theory separately, and the result shows that decentralized control can lower the efficiency of the supply chain. To improve the efficiency of the multi-channels supply chain, we provide the manufacturer with a quantity-discount pricing policy that can coordinate the multi-channels supply chain price. Lastly we use the numerical test and effectiveness analysis, and the result shows that quantity-discount can make the manufacturer and retailer in the supply chain win-win, so it is reasonable and effective.