促销努力成本信息不对称下供应链回购契约

在由一个供应商和一个销售商构成的二级供应链,假设市场需求受到销售商的促销努力水平的影响,销售季节到来之前,销售商根据促销成本和收益决定最优促销努力水平和订货量。在促销成本不可观测时,利用委托代理理论研究信息不对称时如何通过回购契约揭示真实的促销努力成本。研究结果表明销售商有动机将努力促销成本报高,为了吸引销售商显示真实的促销努力成本,供应商必须付出额外的信息租金,随促销成本增大,销售商通过虚报高成本获得的利润减小,故需要揭示真实成本信息所付出的信息租金随之减小。由于信息租金的付出,导致了非效率现象的产生,使得销售商的最优订货量和促销努力水平均小于完全信息下系统的最优水平,只能得到帕累托改进的次优结果。

Design for Supply Chain Contract with Asymmetric Information on Promotional Effort Cost

We consider a supply chain consisting of a supplier and a retailer, in which the customer’s demand is hypothesized to be influenced by retailer’s promotional effort. Before the selling season, the retailer needs to decide his quantity and his effort level according to the effort cost and the revenue. Based on principal-agent theory, this paper studies how to design the buy-back contract and the revenue-sharing contract when the effort cost information can not be observed. The results of the study show that under asymmetric information, in the buy-back contract the supplier and the retailer’s best decisions are as the same as those in the revenue-sharing contract. Asymmetric information results in efficiency, the retailer’s best order quantities and the promotional effort level are lower than those under the centralized decision, and only the result with Pareto efficiency is gained which is inferior to optimization.