Nash equilibria on topological semilattices

A function ${u : X \to \mathbb{R}}$ defined on a partially ordered set is quasi-Leontief if, for all ${x \in X}$ , the upper level set ${\{x\prime \in X : u(x\prime) \geq u(x)\}}$ has a smallest element; such an element is an efficient point of u. An abstract game ${u_{i} : \prod^{n}_{j=1} X_j \to \mathbb{R}, i \in \{1, \ldots , n\}}$ , is a quasi-Leontief game if, for all i and all ${(x_{j})_{j \neq i} \in \prod_{j \neq i} X_{j}, u_{i}((x_{j})_{j \neq i};-) : X_{i} \to \mathbb{R}}$ is quasi-Leontief; a Nash equilibrium x* of an abstract game ${u_{i} :\prod^{n}_{j=1} X_{j} \to \mathbb{R}}$ is efficient if, for all ${i, x^{*}_{i}}$ is an efficient point of the partial function ${u_{i}((x^{*}_{j})_{j \neq i};-) : X_{i} \to \mathbb{R}}$ . We establish the existence of efficient Nash equilibria when the strategy spaces X _i are topological semilattices which are Peano continua and Lawson semilattices.