Sets in excess demand in simple ascending auctions with unit-demand bidders |
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| Authors: | T Andersson C Andersson A J J Talman |
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| Institution: | 1. Department of Economics, Lund University, P.O. Box 7082, 220 07, Lund, Sweden
2. CentER, Department of Econometrics and Operations Research, Tilburg University, P.O. Box 90153, 5000 LE, Tilburg, The Netherlands
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| Abstract: | This paper analyzes the problem of selecting a set of items whose prices are to be updated in the next iteration in so called simple ascending auctions with unit-demand bidders. A family of sets called “sets in excess demand” is introduced, and the main result demonstrates that a simple ascending auction always terminates at the minimum Walrasian equilibrium prices if and only if the selection belongs to this family. |
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