Two noncooperative games between a coalition and its surrounding in a class of n-person games with constant sum |
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Institution: | NISTRAMAN Consulting P.O. Box 1314 Brookline, MA 02446, U.S.A. |
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Abstract: | A cooperative game engendered by a noncooperative n-person game (the master game) in which any subset of n players may form a coalition playing an antagonistic game against the residual players (the surrounding) that has a (Nash equilibrium) solution, is considered, along with another noncooperative game in which both a coalition and its surrounding try to maximize their gains that also possesses a Nash equilibrium solution. It is shown that if the master game is the one with constant sum, the sets of Nash equilibrium strategies in both above-mentioned noncooperative games (in which a coalition plays with (against) its surrounding) coincide. |
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