CLEANING A RIVER: AN ANALYSIS OF VOLUNTARY JOINT ACTION |
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Authors: | MICHAEL F GENGENBACH HANS‐PETER WEIKARD ERIK ANSINK |
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Institution: | 1. Environmental Economics and Natural Resource Group, Wageningen University E‐mail: michaelgengenbach@gmx.de;2. Environmental Economics and Natural Resource Group, Wageningen University, The Netherlands;3. Institute for Environmental Studies, VU University Amsterdam, The Netherlands |
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Abstract: | Abstract River pollution creates negative externalities to downstream water users. In this paper, we analyze how voluntary joint action of water users can improve pollution abatement when optimal treatment cannot be enforced. We model a transboundary pollution game with a unidirectional pollutant flow. Players are identical except for their location along the river. We find that, surprisingly, the location of coalition members has no impact on coalition stability. Location does, however, affect overall welfare. The more upstream the members of the coalition are, the higher is the overall welfare because the positive externalities of cleaning accrue to a larger number of downstream water users. |
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Keywords: | Transboundary pollution coalition formation wastewater treatment partition function approach river‐basin management |
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