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A constrained egalitarian solution for convex multi-choice games |
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| Authors: | R. Branzei N. Llorca J. Sánchez-Soriano S. Tijs |
| Affiliation: | 1. Faculty of Computer Science, “Alexandru Ioan Cuza” University, Iasi, Romania 2. CIO and Department of Statistics, Mathematics and Computer Science, University Miguel Hernández of Elche, Elche, Spain 3. CentER and Department of Econometrics and Operations Research, Tilburg University, Tilburg, The Netherlands |
| Abstract: | This paper deals with a constrained egalitarian solution for convex multi-choice games named the d value. It is proved that the d value of a convex multi-choice game belongs to the precore, Lorenz dominates each other element of the precore and possesses a population monotonicity property regarding players’ participation levels. Furthermore, an axiomatic characterization is given where a specific consistency property plays an important role. |
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