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| 市场竞争与国有企业所有权安排 | |
| 引用本文： | 毕雪阳,孙庆文,陈敬良.市场竞争与国有企业所有权安排[J].数学的实践与认识,2006,36(3):84-90. |
| 作者姓名： | 毕雪阳 孙庆文 陈敬良 |
| 作者单位： | 1. 上海理工大学管理学院,上海,200093;上海金融学院教务处,上海,201209 2. 上海第二军医大学数学系,上海,200433 3. 上海理工大学,上海,200093 |
| 摘 要： | 改进了张维迎对地区间竞争与国有企业民营化的分析,给出了经营者的剩余索取份额对竞争性的连续依赖关系:国有企业若要降低成本,就必须参与市场竞争,随着市场竞争的加强,国有企业经营者的剩余索取份额应该逐渐增大,而当市场竞争水平超过某一阈值,国有企业经营者拥有全部剩余索取权是最优的. |
| 关 键 词： | 剩余索取权 委托代理 信息不对称 博弈 均衡 |
| 修稿时间： | 2005年1月16日 |
Market Competition and Assignment of Ownership within State-Owned Enterprises |
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| BI Xue-yang,SUN Qing-wen,CHEN Jing-liang.Market Competition and Assignment of Ownership within State-Owned Enterprises[J].Mathematics in Practice and Theory,2006,36(3):84-90. | |
| Authors: | BI Xue-yang SUN Qing-wen CHEN Jing-liang |
| Abstract: | The residual claims of the managers of state-owned enterprises(SOEs) may be continuously rely on competition is proved in the paper.If SOEs want to reducing their operating costs,a competitive market is the key.When produce market is getting more competitive,the more share of residual claims should be paied to the managers of SOEs.A threshold is exist,and if the competition is over the threshold,all residual claims paied to the managers of state-owned enterprises is proved optimal. |
| Keywords: | residuals claims principal-agent theory asymmetric information game equilibrium |
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