| Abstract: | ABSTRACT. This paper investigates the intertemporal effects of introducing Individual Transferable Quota, ITQ, fishery management programs on stock size, fleet size and composition, and returns to quota holders and to vessel operators. Theoretical analysis is conducted using a specific version of a general dynamic model of a regulated fishery. It is demonstrated that the effects will differ depending upon the prevailing regulation program, current stock size, and existing fleet size, composition and mobility and upon how the stock and fleet change over time after the switch to ITQs. The paper expands upon previous works by modeling the dynamics of change in fleet and stock size and by allowing for changes in the TAC as stock size changes, by comparing ITQs to different regulations, and by allowing the status quo before ITQ implementation to be something other than a bioeconomic equilibrium. Specific cases are analyzed using a simulation model. The analysis shows that the annual return per unit harvest to quota owners can increase or decrease over the transition period due to counteracting effects of changes in stock and fleet size. With ITQs denominated as a percentage of the TAC, the current annual value of a quota share depends upon the annual return per unit of harvest and the annual amount of harvest rights. Because the per unit value can increase or decrease over time, it is also possible that the total value can do the same. Distribution effects are also studied and it is shown that while the gains from quota share received are the present value of a potentially infinite stream of returns, potential losses are the present value of a finite stream, the length of which depends upon the remaining life of the vessel and the expected time it will continue to operate. |
