公众参与视角下的央地环境规制博弈分析

本文首先构建环境规制中中央政府和地方政府的两方演化博弈模型,并在此基础上将公众作为第三方参与主体,构建中央政府、地方政府和公众三方演化博弈模型,详细比较两方和三方博弈模型的区别,探究各个主体策略行为的影响因素。研究发现:(1)未有公众参与下,地方政府策略选择主要受地方政府积极执行成本、环境收益、经济损失,消极执行的环境政绩损失,中央政府监管力度、治理补贴和对地方政府的处罚等因素影响;中央政府的监管策略主要受到严格监管的成本以及对地方政府的治理补贴和处罚等因素影响。引入公众参与后,在央地两方博弈的基础上,地方政府环境规制执行策略的影响因素还增加了地方政府被举报后所受到的追加处罚,中央政府监管策略的影响因素还增加了中央政府监管力度、对地方政府的追加处罚以及中央政府的公信力损失。(2)未有公众参与下,中央政府严格监管的概率随地方政府积极执行概率的增大而减小。引入公众参与后,中央政府严格监管率随地方政府积极执行概率的增大而增大。说明在公众参与下,地方政府积极执行环境规制对中央政府严格监管产生的抑制作用转变成了促进作用。(3)地方政府积极执行的概率、中央政府严格监管的概率都随公众举报概率的增大而增大。说明公众参与不仅对地方政府承担环保责任具有促进作用,而且有利于促使中央政府落实环境治理政策。

Game Analysis of Environmental Regulation between Central Government and Local Government under the Perspective of Public Participation

Firstly, this paper constructs a two-party evolutionary game model of central government and local government in environmental regulation. On this basis, taking the public as the third party participant, it constructs a three-party evolutionary game model of central government, local government and the public, compares the differences between the two-party and three-party game models in detail, and explores the influencing factors of each main body's strategic behavior. The results show that: (1)Without public participation, the implementation strategy of local government's environmental regulation is mainly affected by the cost, environmental benefit and economic loss of local government's active implementation, the environmental performance loss of passive implementation of environmental regulation, the intensity of central government's supervision, governance subsidy and punishment to local government, etc. The supervision strategy of central government is mainly affected by the cost of strict supervision and the governance subsidies and penalties of local government and other factors. After introducing public participation, on the basis of the game between central and local governments, the influencing factors of the implementation strategy of local government environmental regulation also increase the additional penalties that local governments are subjected to after being reported. The influencing factors of the central government's supervision strategy also increase the intensity of central government's supervision, the additional penalties to local governments and the loss of the credibility of the central government. (2)Without public participation, the probability of the central government's strict supervision strategy decreases with the increase of the probability of the local government's active implementation. After the introduction of public participation, the probability of the central government's strict supervision strategy increases with the increase of the probability of the local government's active implementation. It shows that under the participation of the public, the restraining effect of the local government's active implementation of environmental regulations on the central government's strict supervision has changed into a promoting role. (3)The probability of active implementation by local governments and strict supervision by the central government increase with the increase of the probability of public reporting. It shows that public participation not only promotes local governments to undertake environmental responsibility, but also helps to promote the central government to implement environmental governance policies.