基于消费者行为的食品溯源信息监管策略研究

溯源信息真实性直接影响食品可溯源体系建设和消费者对食品安全信心。本文基于消费者行为理论,构建溯源信息掺假与不掺假以及掺假比例大小、政府监管力度强弱情形时企业最优定价决策模型。结果表明,无论消费者购买可溯源产品的溯源信息量高低,企业均选择溯源信息掺假,此时政府两种策略:一是加强监管力度和惩罚力度,迫使企业不敢溯源信息掺假;二是提升产品低溯源信息程度,缩小高低溯源信息程度差异,促使企业无可掺假信息空间。通过高低溯源信息程度对企业最优决策影响研究,低监管情形下企业最优决策受到高低溯源信息程度影响较为显著,高监管情形下企业最优决策受其影响较小。

Research on the Food Traceability Information Supervision Strategy Based on Consumer Behavior

Traceability information credibility directly influences food traceability system construction and consumer confidence in food safety. In this paper, based on the consumer behavior theory, the optimal pricing decision model is made in the case of the adulteration and non-adulteration of the source information and the adulterated proportion and the strength of government supervision. The results show whether the consumers purchase high-information or low-information traceability product, the firm chooses to adulterate the traceability information. There are two strategies for the government. Firstly, it strengthens supervision and punishment effort, by forcing firms unable to trace the source information to adulterate. Secondly, it is necessary to improve the level of low traceability information and reduce the difference of the high and low information in order to leave no room for adulteration for the firms. By the high and low level of traceability information impact study in the optimal decision of firms, it is significant that the optimal decision under the low supervision case is affected by the high and low level of traceability information, which is opposite for the high regulation case.