A necessary and sufficient condition for Pareto-optimal security strategies in multicriteria matrix games |
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Authors: | D Ghose |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Aerospace Engineering, Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore, India |
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Abstract: | In this paper, a scalar game is derived from a zero-sum multicriteria matrix game, and it is proved that the solution of the new game with strictly positive scalarization is a necessary and sufficient condition for a strategy to be a Pareto-optimal security strategy (POSS) for one of the players in the original game. This is done by proving that a certain set, which is the extension of the set of security level vectors in the criterion function space, is convex and polyhedral. It is also established that only a finite number of scalarizations are necessary to obtain all the POSS for a player. An example is included to illustrate the main steps in the proof.This work was done while the author was a Research Associate in the Department of Electrical Engineering at the Indian Institute of Science and was financially supported by the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research, Delhi, India.The author wishes to express his gratefulness to Professor U. R. Prasad for helpful discussions and to two anonymous referees for suggestions which led to an improved presentation. |
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Keywords: | Game theory multicriteria games games with vector payoffs Pareto-optimal security strategies multicriteria optimization scalarization methods |
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