The selectope for cooperative games |
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| Authors: | Jean Derks Hans Haller Hans Peters |
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| Affiliation: | (1) Department of Mathematics, University of Maastricht, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands (e-mail: jean.derks@math.unimaas.nl), NL;(2) Department of Economics, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg, VA 24061-0316, USA (e-mail: haller@vt.edu), US;(3) Department of Economics, University of Maastricht, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands (e-mail: h.peters@ke.unimaas.nl), NL |
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| Abstract: | ![]()
The selectope of a cooperative transferable utility game is the convex hull of the payoff vectors obtained by assigning the Harsanyi dividends of the coalitions to members determined by so-called selectors. The selectope is studied from a set-theoretic point of view, as superset of the core and of the Weber set; and from a value-theoretic point of view, as containing weighted Shapley values, random order values, and sharing values. Received May 1997/Revised version September 1999 |
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| Keywords: | : Cooperative game selectope core Weber set sharing value |
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