| Abstract: | We re-visit the problem of optimal insurance design under Rank-Dependent Expected Utility (RDEU) examined by Bernard et al. (2015), Xu (2018), and Xu et al. (2018). Unlike the latter, we do not impose the no-sabotage condition on admissible indemnities, that is, that indemnity and retention functions be nondecreasing functions of the loss. Rather, in a departure from the aforementioned work, we impose a state-verification cost that the insurer can incur in order to verify the loss severity, hence automatically ruling out any ex post moral hazard that could otherwise arise from possible misreporting of the loss by the insured. We fully characterize the optimal indemnity schedule and discuss how our results relate to those of Bernard et al. (2015) and Xu et al. (2018). We then extend the setting by allowing for a distortion premium principle, with a distortion function that differs from that of the insured, and we provide a characterization of the optimal retention in that case. |
