Cooperation in dividing the cake |
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Authors: | Marco Dall’Aglio Rodica Branzei Stef Tijs |
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Institution: | 1. University “G. d’Annunzio”, Pescara, Italy 2. University “Alexandru Ioan Cuza”, Ia?i, Romania 3. Tilburg University, Tilburg, The Netherlands
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Abstract: | This paper defines models of cooperation among players partitioning a completely divisible good (such as a cake or a piece
of land). The novelty of our approach lies in the players’ ability to form coalitions before the actual division of the good
with the aim to maximize the average utility of the coalition. A social welfare function which takes into account coalitions
drives the division. In addition, we derive a cooperative game which measures the performance of each coalition. This game
is compared with the game in which players start cooperating only after the good has been portioned and has been allocated
among the players. We show that a modified version of the game played before the division outperforms the game played after
the division. |
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