Subgame Consistent Cooperative Solution of Dynamic Games with Random Horizon |
| |
Authors: | D W K Yeung L A Petrosyan |
| |
Institution: | 1.SRS Consortium for Advanced Study,Hong Kong Shue Yan University,North Point,Hong Kong;2.Centre for Game Theory,St. Petersburg State University,St. Petersburg,Russia;3.Faculty of Applied Mathematics & Control Processes, Centre for Game Theory,St. Petersburg State University,St. Petersburg,Russia |
| |
Abstract: | In cooperative dynamic games, a stringent condition—that of subgame consistency—is required for a dynamically stable cooperative solution. In particular, under a subgame-consistent cooperative solution
an extension of the solution policy to a subgame starting at a later time with a state brought about by prior optimal behavior
will remain optimal. This paper extends subgame-consistent solutions to dynamic (discrete-time) cooperative games with random
horizon. In the analysis, new forms of the Bellman equation and the Isaacs–Bellman equation in discrete-time are derived.
Subgame-consistent cooperative solutions are obtained for this class of dynamic games. Analytically tractable payoff distribution
mechanisms, which lead to the realization of these solutions, are developed. This is the first time that subgame-consistent
solutions for cooperative dynamic games with random horizon are presented. |
| |
Keywords: | |
本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录! |
|